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Abstract
The central focus of this project is to discover children’s understanding of the semantics,
or meaning, of negation. Children’s knowledge of negation develops, in part, by directing
attention away from a word to something else (i.e., contrast classes), yet little is known about to
what attention is directed. Two possible relations upon which contrast classes operate are
taxonomic and thematic relations. For example, when looking at the concept of a “dog”, a
thematic relation could be a dog bone, while a taxonomic relation would be a cat. Two
experiments were completed to look at children’s use of thematic and taxonomic relations in
negations. Experiment 1 examined thematic and non-thematic relations while Experiment two
compared thematic and taxonomic relations. Results demonstrated that children did not make
use of thematic relations and preferred taxonomic to thematic relations. The results suggest that
initial contrast classes appear to be formed via taxonomic but not thematic relations.

Hiltz 3
Introduction
Negation
Negation, that which prescribes truth or falsity to any statement, is an important concept
of children’s language acquisition. In particular, there are various semantic categories for child
negation, including rejection, disappearance, unfulfilled expectations, truth-functional and selfprohibition (Pea, 1980). Rejection negatives are action-based, where a child rejects an event,
person, object or activity (e.g. the answer “no” to the question “do you want a cookie?”).
Alternatively, disappearance negation refers to the disappearance of something which had been
present, but is no longer there. Next, unfulfilled expectations are used to comment on some
aspect of the child’s continuing line of activity which does not occur (e.g. toys that cannot be
found). Truth-functional negation is used in response to an utterance by the child that
expresses a proposition that is either true or false depending on the situation. Finally, selfprohibition negation is used when a child acts in a way that has been previously prohibited and
then expresses a negative. Each of these five categories contributes to the development of
negation and provides a strong link to communication and reasoning. Without effective use of
negation, children are unable to communicate properly with others and accurately express their
thoughts. Thus, the concept of negation is important in the overall understanding of higherorder relations (Pea, 1980).
During the acquisition period of negations, many changes start occurring within the mind
which can be explained by language comprehension models. Typically, children create models
of meaning while still attempting to understand language. A specific type of model that is
involved with language comprehension and memory retrieval is a situation model. Situation
models are integrated metal representations of any described state of affairs (Zwann &
Radvansky, 1998). According to this model, language is a set of processing instructions on how
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to construct a mental representation of a situation, rather than information that is analyzed and
then stored in memory. For example, a situation model of a restaurant visit would be a mental
representation of a specific restaurant visit (e.g. Friday, June 23rd at Olive Garden with Jamie).
Situation models are invaluable when explaining language processing, and can be used when
analyzing comprehension of negation.
Negation is a strange phenomenon, and when developing this language skill, children
tend to focus on what others are talking about instead of what is not being discussed. When
explaining the development of negation, research has focused heavily on 3 areas including the
syntax of negation, the semantics and pragmatics of negation and the role of negation in the
evaluation of truth-values. Additionally, the way children interpret negatives using syntax (Klima
& Bellugi, 1967) and semantic models (Johnson-Laird 1983) of the language. Syntax provides
information about what is included in the scope of the negation. For example, in the statement I
don’t see the car but I see John, the placement of the negation suggests that the car is within its
scope but John is not within its scope. Although the word no is often one of the first words
produced and comprehended by children (Morris, 2003), negations can be quite complicated for
children to produce and comprehend. Unlike affirmations, negations require integrating both the
semantic and pragmatic information that is associated with it and an additional processing step
beyond affirmations (Morris, 2003). That is, it appears as though people create models of
affirmations first, and then incorporate negations into those models later (Hasson & Glucksberg,
2006). Additional evidence for this additional processing step comes from reaction time studies
in which responses to negated statements are consistently slower than affirmed statements
(Kaup, Lu¨dtke, & Zwaan, 2006).
Between the ages of three and five, there is a tremendous change in children’s
understanding of negation and usage of the words “no” and “not” and by age 5, children are
able to correctly identify a negated statement as true or false (Kim, 1985). It has also been
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shown that when faced with an ambiguous statement containing a negation, children tend to
only interpret the statement in one way, rather than considering all of the possible meanings
(Gennari & MacDonald, 2005/2006). Additionally, language comprehension researchers have
found that when attempting to comprehend a text, individuals tend to form a mental
representation of the described situation. This is also true with negation, and it has been shown
that people mentally simulate the negated situation in order to process the negation correctly
(Kaup et. al., 2006). These factors greatly impact the understanding of the negated statements,
and may lead to varying interpretations of the same statements. Thus, one unanswered
question is how semantics influence how children interpret negations.
Contrast Classes
Once children develop knowledge of the meaning of words, they automatically form
relations between concepts. In the early stages of development it seems as though thematic
relations are preferred when contrasting concepts or objects, but this preference may not
continue throughout all course of development. In actuality, young children and elderly adults
show a preference for thematic relations, while the ages in between prefer taxonomic relations
(Waxman & Namy, 1997). Although children use both thematic and taxonomic relations with
affirmations, it is unclear how these relations influence models of negations. One possibility is
that when these relations are paired with negations, they form contrast classes. Contrast
classes are psychological concepts that are made up of the most likely or relevant members of
a complement set (Oaksford & Stenning, 1992). When expressing a negated statement, people
tend to make assumptions based on what is actually occurring (rather than simply what has not
occurred). For instance, when stating that “John is not drinking coffee,” one would most likely
assume that he must be drinking another hot beverage, such as tea or hot chocolate, rather
than inferring that he is drinking a cold beverage, such as milk or beer (Oaksford, 2002). When
trying to explain this concept, Apostel (1972) claims that psychological negation means only the
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disjunction of a few (perhaps one) alternatives lying in some sense close to the negated
sentence. This occurs because contrast classes make use of cues from the affirmed statement
to determine what is truly happening in the negation (Apostel, 1972).
As stated above, preschool aged children use taxonomic and thematic relations. For
example, when looking at the concept of a “dog”, a thematic relation could be a dog bone, while
a taxonomic relation would be a cat. Within the field of cognitive development, there is a strong
belief that pre-school age children have a conceptual preference for thematic over taxonomic
relations (Waxman and Namy, 1997). Waxman and Namy (1997) used three experiments to
examine the strong assumption that early cognitive development is best characterized by
thematic preference for preschool children that later gives way to taxonomic preference as the
child gets older. The results of the experiments show that this assumption may in fact be
incorrect, and there could be another possible explanation. According to the data, the findings
suggest a more continuous developmental function with no distinct shift from one conceptual
mode to another (Waxman & Namy, 1997).
Research Question
Although a large amount of research with young children has focused on preferences of
thematic and taxonomic relations with affirmations, little research has been conducted with
negations. The current study looks at whether children prefer thematic over taxonomic relations
when paired with negation. Specifically, we investigated how taxonomic and thematic
information may be used to form contrast classes used to interpret negations. Studying how
children develop different dimensions of language, such as negation, is not only interesting, but
is also a necessary step in the complex understanding of the human mind.
Methods
Participants
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The participants include 34 preschool aged children between the ages of 3 and 5 (M =
4.1, range 2.9-5.8). There were 18 females and 16 males. The majority of participants were
Caucasian (23 Caucasians, 3 Asian, 1 Indian, 7 n/a). Subjects involved in the study were
selected for participation based on a signed parental permission form.
Materials
Materials included a variety of different toys, which represented both thematic and
taxonomic objects, and a basket in which the toys were placed in by the participants. A
complete list of all materials can be found in the Appendix.
Procedure
The procedure of the current study can be defined as a selection task framed as a
modified “I spy” game. Before beginning each of the experiments, the child completed a warmup, or practice, phase to ensure that they understood what would be asked of them (detailed
below). If a child seemed unsure about what to do, the experimenter would continue practicing
until the participant demonstrated an accurate understanding of the activity by correctly
identifying an object. At any time during the experiment, a child who was uncomfortable and
wanted to cease participation in the activity, was able to opt out and leave the study. Each child
was tested individually in a quiet area and the entire procedure lasted for approximately 20
minutes or so. In order to reward the participants for taking part in the study, each of the
children was given a small prize of negligible value (less than one dollar), such as a sticker or
choice of a toy, once the experiment was over.
Warm-up Phase
During the warm-up phase, the experimenter first placed a basket and an object on the
table (e.g. a dog), and said “What I spy is a dog. Now what should you put in the basket?” Upon
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receiving the correct answer, the experimenter moved on to a more complex test, by adding
another object (e.g. a car) and said “What I spy is NOT the dog. Now what should you put in the
basket?” Once the child answered this question, the experimenter moved on to Experiment 1.
Experiment 1
In the first experiment, the objects used included a target object (e.g., a dog), one
thematically related object (e.g. a bone) and one thematically unrelated object (e.g. a book).
The child was then told, “What I spy is NOT a (target item)”, and was then asked to place their
choice in the basket. When showing the objects to the child and asking the questions, the
experimenter avoided eye contact with both the participant and materials in order to minimize
nonverbal cues. The placement of the thematically related objects and the unrelated objects
were systematically varied. Responses were then coded as either thematically related or nonthematically related. This experiment consisted of 10 trials and took about ten minutes to
complete.
Experiment 2
The procedure of Experiment 2 was identical to the procedure used in Experiment 1, the
only difference being the materials used in the study. For the Experiment 2, the objects
included a target item (e.g. a cat), a taxonomically related object (e.g. a dog) and a thematically
related object (e.g. a cat toy). This experiment consisted of 12 trials and took approximately ten
minutes to complete.
Coding
Previous research (Morris, 2003; Waxman & Namy, 1997) has suggested that individual
consistency in performance is a measure of understanding. If a child consistently provides the
same type of response, this suggests a stable understanding of the concept. We used coding
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criteria similar to Waxman & Namy (1997) in that providing the same response on at least 75%
of trials was considered consistent (e.g., for Experiment 1 this was 7/10 and for Experiment 2
this was 9/12. This sets up a stringent decision rule because the conditional probability of
selecting a thematic option is .5 on a single trial but is .007 on 7 of 10 trials in Experiment 1. In
Experiment 1, children could be coded as using a consistent thematic response pattern, a
consistent non-thematic pattern, or no consistent pattern. In Experiment 2, children could be
coded as using a consistent thematic pattern, a consistent taxonomic pattern, or no consistent
pattern.
Results
The following results are based on a comparison of the number of children coded as
using a consistent response pattern. In Experiment 1, when given the choice between a
thematic and a non-thematic object, children did not select thematically related items at levels
above chance x2 (2, N = 34) = 14.3, p > .01. As indicated below in Figure 1, only 30% of the
participants chose the thematically related object consistently (i.e. at least 75% of the time). In
fact, the only value that was higher than chance was the number of kids that showed no
consistent pattern. It appears that when paired with the word “not” (i.e. negating the phrase),
the selection patterns for both types were at chance levels.
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Figure 1: Experiment 1 Results

Figure 1: Demonstrates that children showed no preference of thematic items over nonnon
thematic items.

Unlike Experiment 1, the results of Experiment 2 show a clear preference for taxonomic
relations. The number of kids coded as consisten
consistently
tly selecting taxonomic choices was
significantly higher than chance x2 (2, N = 34) = 64 p > .01. Thus, given the choice between a
taxonomic and thematic object, children selected taxonomically related objects more often than
thematically related objects.

Hiltz 11
Figure 2: Experiment 2 Results

Figure 2: Demonstrates that in Experiment 2, children clearly preferred taxonomic items
to thematic items.

Discussion
The results of the study show that initial contrast classes appear to make use of
taxonomic relations, but not thematic relations. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that
children did not make use of thematic relations when interpreting negations. The results of
Experiment 2 demonstrated a strong preference of taxonomic relations over thematic relations
when given a choice between the two d
during a selection task. These findings suggest that by 33
5 years old, children’s semantic knowledge of negations rely on knowledge of taxonomic
relations between objects, rather than thematic relations.
When relating these findings to previous research conducted with thematic and
taxonomic relations in affirmations, it is apparent that negations are represented differently than
affirmations. Most research supports the claim that preschool age children pr
prefer
efer thematic over
taxonomic relations in affirmations (Waxman & Namy, 1997). In affirmations both relations are
informative in that they increase the amount of information conveyed to the listener. However,
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negations appear to be somewhat different in that taxonomic relations appear to increase
information but not thematic relations. For example, stating that I do not have a dog might
convey that this person has no dog, has no pets or has a pet but this pet is not a dog. This set
of options is limited to taxonomic relations rather than thematic relations. Following Oaskford
(2003) taxonomic relations have some possibility of being true. Thematic relations are highly
unlikely to be true and add little information to negated statements.
For further research and replications of the current study, several limitations should be
addressed. Primarily, the choice of items used in both experiments 1 and 2 should be closely
considered and perhaps more gender neutral. For example, in trial 7 of experiment 2, the
negated target item is a coin, while the thematic option is a purse and the taxonomic item is a
dollar bill. Consequently, more female participants may have chosen the purse because it was
more appealing to them, and male participants would be more reluctant to choose the purse
because it was more feminine. Another limitation is the sample size of the participants. Upon
further replication of these experiments, it would be beneficial to have a larger sample size with
a wider variety of ethnic groups. Overall, negation is a truly unique phenomenon that is
currently not fully understood. More research needs to be completed in order to determine how
negation is developed and how contrast classes affect relations between objects in the world.
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Appendix A
Response Sheet

Name ______________________

Gender M F Ethnicity ____________________

Age _________________

Birthdate ____________________

Experiment 1
Trial
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Target
Backpack
Golf Club
Cat
Dog
Nurse
Bike
Boat
Flashlight
House
Window

Thematic
Book
Golf Ball
Cat Toy
Bone
Band-aid
Helmet
Anchor
Battery
Mailbox
Curtain

Non-Thematic
Shoe
Clock
Breadstick
Milk
Butter
Purse
Watch
Dog Bone
Bottle
Cow

Taxonomic
Airplane
Boat
Tree
Marker
Shoe
Soccer Ball
Dollar Bill
Horse
Clock
Roll
Doll
Toe

Thematic
Anchor
Tire
Vase
Paper
Umbrella
Baseball Glove
Purse
Milk
Wrist
Butter
Bottle
Ring

Experiment 2
Trial
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Target
Boat
Car
Flower
Crayon
Rain boots
Baseball
Coin
Cow
Watch
Breadstick
Baby
Finger
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Appendix B
Negation Script

Seat child near researcher at table. It is best if the child is seated directly across from the
researcher. We are going to play a game today with these toys. You may have played a
game like it before called “I Spy”. In our game, I will give you a hint and you will try to
guess what I Spy by putting something into the basket. Let’s try one. Place dog on the
table. What I Spy is a dog. Now what should you put in the basket? (Correct if necessary).
Let’s try it again. Place dog and car on the table. What I Spy is NOT the dog. Now what
should you put in the basket? (correct if necessary).

If child gets this question wrong: Let’s try another one. Place cat and boat on table. What I
Spy is NOT the boat. Now what should you put in the basket? (correct if necessary)

Now we are going to play the first game. After you are done playing the game, you can
pick out a prize and a sticker, OK? Remember, I will give you a hint about what I Spy and
you guess by putting things in the basket. After I give my hint, I will close my eyes so I
can’t see what you put in the basket. Then you can tell me to open my eyes.

Are you ready? Good, let’s get started.

Place first set of objects on table. On each trial target object should be closer to researcher and
options should be equally close to child. Place basket near child.

What I Spy is NOT the ________. Now, I will close me eyes. After you place something in
the basket, you can tell me to open my eyes. Mark option on response sheet.

